Montenegro in NATO: Closing the collective security circle

Despite the contradictory attitudes of pro-Russian and anti-Western circles in the region which are fluctuating in a wide amplitude from the hysterical opposition to the mockery and denial of any significance Montenegro’s formal accession into NATO membership, this event represents a milestone for the future of Western Balkans as a whole. Regardless of the size and the relatively modest military capacities of Montenegro, the geostrategic importance of accepting new Balkan states into the ranks of the North Atlantic Alliance goes far beyond purely military component. Specific constellation of geopolitical factors in the region of the Western Balkans, makes this last enlargement of the Alliance a historic moment, a pan on the scale, which will decisively influence the direction of the further course of the process of stabilization, democratization and building of regional collective security system. In addition, there is an undeniable fact that with this last expansion, NATO closed the so-called Balkan security ring. This event will not only have a decisive impact on the strategic orientation of other regional players, but it will also significantly reduce the possibility of external, non-Balkan actors destabilizing this part of the world.

Successful completion of the procedures that lead to the formal receipt of Montenegro as NATO’s 29th member state, [1] puts en end to a conflict and post-conflict transition in the region which after the end of the Cold War, spent more than a decade in numerous destructive and destabilizing activities. After the overthrow of aggressive, authoritarian and conflict-prone regime of Slobodan Milosevic, who participated in almost all of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 90s, and whose bloody battles had to be stopped by the military intervention of NATO, it was necessary to invest tremendous efforts, with the constant monitoring and active presence of the international community, in order to establish lasting peace and lead the countries of Western Balkans towards institutional reforms and integration processes.

And while the significant part of the region, without major oscillations, clearly opted for integration into the structures of the Euro-Atlantic community, Serbia, as a country with great potential to stabilize, but as well destabilize regional stability, remained captured in an insurmountable gap between the rational security options open to it, and the still unsurpassed frustration which was a result of the losses suffered during the NATO intervention in 1999. As a way to resolve this irresolvable dualism pressuring Serbian society, a concept of military neutrality was introduced into political agenda, and over time, it took the form of this quasi-institutional obstacle to the possible future membership of Serbia in NATO.

Rejection of the predominant part of the key public and political actors in Serbia to accept the reality that NATO, after the end of the Cold War, no longer represents one of the two mutually opposing military-political blocs in Europe, but the only functional system of collective security on the continent, had its influence even beyond the Serbian borders, especially in those countries with large Serbian national communities, whose political representatives are merely the extended arm of the government in Belgrade. Thus, under the direct influence and substantial support of the structures in official Serbia, while persistently abusing the mechanisms established by the Dayton Peace Agreement, the leader of the Serbian Republic Milorad Dodik blocked the aspirations of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) towards the membership in NATO, while until mid-2012, official Belgrade financially, logistically and ideologically assisted the anti-institutional opposition in Montenegro, whose two key points of association were non-acceptance of Montenegro’s independence and strong opposition to the country’s membership in the North Atlantic alliance. Nevertheless, since in recent years, Serbia finally recognized its position in the promotion of regional stability as its vital national interest, the structures that have been fueled for their anti-Western discourse from the official structures in Belgrade, turned to political, intelligence and financial support of official Moscow, which, after the conflict in Ukraine, found an ideal opportunity to demonstrate its global power and turn the focus from the events in its immediate neighborhood by destabilizing the ever-vulnerable Balkans. [2] [3] [4] [5]

Hardline anti-NATO nationalist circles in Serbia and their followers in the smaller BH and Montenegro entities have been further strengthened by the negative trends in relations between Russia and the West, whereas recent foreign policy aspirations of the official Moscow fell right into those parts of the Balkans where Russia had traditional strongholds of influence for centuries. Under the current circumstances, this part of the world became almost an ideal candidate for the bargaining tool in the implementation of unrealistic global ambitions of the current Russian President Vladimir Putin to take on the role of a challenger to the so far undisputed global dominance of the United States.

For these reasons, starting from 2006, Russia has been trying to establish a broader range of influence in the Balkans, this disintegrated space nestled in the furthest Eastern external borders of NATO, starting from the region’s energy dependence on Russia, to the increased intelligence, media and advertising activity in the region. 

In terms of an incomplete integration of the region into the collective security system under the auspices of NATO, there was a constant risk of the reactivation of the old frozen tensions, which were, as a rule, further strengthened by the continuous intensive interference of the interested foreign influences. In the absence of available land connection with the region, and for the realization of its hybrid warfare concept, Russia’s key goal was that Montenegro as the only coastal country in the region, remains outside of NATO borders and militarily "neutral", and thus safe for any potential Russian action in the depths Balkan peninsula.

Precisely for this reason, after the fall of the Milosevic regime and through the President of at the time Yugoslavia Vojislav Kostunica, Russia has tried to the obtain the naval base in Kumbor, Montenegro for its needs, while directing the investment activities of its nationals towards the extensive purchase of property on the Montenegrin coast, thus attempting to strengthen Montenegro’s economic ties with Russia, and establish soft power channels for the Russian presence and influence over the country. 

The danger of a resurgence of decades-long regional tensions was further enhanced by the escalation of quarrels between the West and Russia on the Ukrainian crisis and the war in Syria. Thus, for the Russian interests in the Balkans, a mere announcement that Montenegro could receive an invitation for membership in NATO, meant a complete closure of the last remaining corridor into the heart of region that Russia could use, in case it was blocked by NATO, to transport logistics required for the conduct of a hybrid war.

At that moment it was clear that Montenegro's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures will close the Balkan security ring, composed of NATO member countries, which completely surround the states that have not yet become an integral part of the system of collective security in the Balkans, and as such represent a potential source of conflict in the region. Moreover, with the future admission of Macedonia into NATO, [6] the security dilemma in the region will be irreversibly concluded, with the region categorically becoming an integrated part of the collective security system lead by the North Atlantic alliance. Such developments would ensure that all of the countries in the region are protected from potential external security threats, but also the threats of using force in handling mutual misunderstandings.

From the military-strategic point of view, the inability of the military penetration of Russia in this part of the world, will leave the megalomanic projects in the region, such as the ambition of the current authorities in Banja Luka who have been undermining the functionality of Bosnia and Herzegovina and aspiring for secession of BH entity into the Republic of Serbia, in the sphere of irrational dreams. Although this megalomanic idea does not enjoy the support of official state structures in Serbia, in recent years some of the intellectually and politically influential circles in the country were notably forcing the idea of "natural and the only rational compensation" to Serbia for the loss of Kosovo. [7] The idea that this was political reality was entirely based on the belief, which developed after the violent annexation of Crimea to Russia, that in the event of annexation of the Serbian Republic to the Republic of Serbia, Russian political and military support would be highly probable. With the elimination of this possibility, the only potential support for the practical realization of any attempts at redrawing the internationally recognized borders in the Balkans disappeared. After all, Dodik's quiet abandonment of the announced referendum on the BH Prosecutor's Office, but also the absence of any action after the referendum on the Republic Day, was a direct result of the comprehension that he will not enjoy the support of official Belgrade in the implementation of this decision and in case of further escalation, will not benefit from Russia’s concrete assistance, except maybe political and financial. [8]

Because of its clear influence decline in the Balkans, and in the final hour of accession negotiations, the official Moscow used every possible method, sometimes not of such democratic nature, to prevent the entry of Montenegro into NATO.  These efforts culminated with the failed attempt to perform a coup in Podgorica after the Parliamentary elections, after which Russia’s rage towards the smallest Adriatic country reached its verbal climax.  However, while Russian officials’ insults and accusations against Montenegro actually concealed its genuine weakness in the area, their actual attention was focused on disciplining Serbia, which, during an attempted coup in Montenegro played a role that infuriated the Kremlin.

Although Serbia did not publicly reveal details about the participants and their roles in the organization of a failed Russia-supported coup in Podgorica, the ministry and the government in Belgrade, played a significant role in preventing the implementation of Putin's para-intelligence circles bloodbath.  That is why, a few days after the events in Montenegro, the Head of the Russian secret services, Nikolai Patrushev, visited Belgrade, while a short time afterwards, a considerable amount of weapons were found in the woods near the parents house of the Prime Minister of Serbia at the time Aleksandar Vucic, sufficient for an attack on his convoy and members of his family.  Although the investigation did not provide answers about the origin of weapons that were discovered thanks to the "tip of the citizen” in the woods Jajinci, it s a public secret in the Serbian intelligence community that the package was a message from Vladimir Putin to the Prime Minister at the time and current President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vucic. This is supported by Vucic's later behavior in relation to the attempted coup in Montenegro when he ceased to speak about the situation. The sequence of the events includes his continuous servile attitude towards Russia, which culminated with his visit to Moscow and his reluctant consent to accept “the gift” from Vladimir Putin in the form of six aircraft MIG-292 intended for write-offs, which will cost Serbia to put into function almost as much as the purchase of the same number of new aircraft!

In addition to the high level of vulnerability to infiltration and influence of aggressive moves from Russia, and thanks to the policy of military neutrality and negative public attitudes towards NATO, in the regional constellation of power balance, Serbia is in an extremely unfavorable position. All three neuralgic points identified as potential causes of possible conflicts in the Balkans, more precisely Bosnia, Kosovo and northern Macedonia, place Serbia in the risk of conflict with some of the NATO members or the alliance as a whole. In the case of attempted violent secession of the Serbian Republic from Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is certain that this act would be prevented by the intervention of Croatia, which would put Serbia before an impossible choice between passive observation of an unacceptable situation, or entry into almost certain conflict with the Alliance, therefore a possible replay of the events from 1999. A similar situation could happen in the event of a conflict in the north of Kosovo, whose security forces are represented by KFOR, as well as the case of further destabilization of Macedonia which is where the interests of three NATO members and neutral Serbia collide. For all these reasons, the primary national interest of Serbia is to preserve stability in the region, which is on the other hand, diametrically opposed to the interests of Russia, who is trying to maintain its position in the Balkans by creating antagonisms, which could at a certain point result with the involvement of NATO itself, and Russia would step in as a factor of war or peace in the region.

Aware of the potential hazards listed and the increased destructive activities of Russia in the region, Western diplomacies have accelerated the process of resolving Macedonia's membership to NATO issues, which have so far been hindered by an uncompromising attitude of Greece in a quite senseless dispute over Macedonia's name.  In addition to these so far neglected issues, Western countries have announced stronger support to stabilization and encouragement of cooperation in the region through financial support for joint regional projects, which would ensure that any possible future conflicts between the Balkan countries prove to be too expensive and unacceptable. Repositioning of the Euro-Atlantic structures in the countries that have so far remained outside of the NATO security umbrella will inevitably be accompanied by an increased opposition to the growing Russian propaganda, which escalated after the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Ukraine. In an effort to further strengthen and consolidate their sources of soft power in this part of the world, Russia, through its logistical and financial support, logistically supported the establishment of hundreds of organizations and para-media in Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Although these organizations, have not managed to gain momentum, they have succeeded in simulating a false audience, and thus gained a certain influence in those areas predominantly inhabited by the Serbian population, which significantly complicates the agenda of official Belgrade to implement a policy of regional stability, and joint cooperation on different projects.

In addition to the far-reaching military, security and strategic importance of Montenegro's accession to NATO, this act will have very important and positive political consequences for the democratic processes in the region. An example of the gradual maturation of the Montenegrin society from the most Orthodox Balkan russophillic point, to the realization of a visionary development project in which it first achieved its independence, and then successfully completed the process of accession to NATO, Montenegro can serve as a model and example for the persistent continuation of the reform processes that have been taken place in recent years in Serbia itself.

In the same way that Milo Đukanović used his political authority for initiating and implementing major political breakthroughs that Montenegrin society later gradually adapted to, today Aleksandar Vučić has a chance to use his political authority and the support he enjoys to initiate and carry out the necessary reforms in Serbia, whose social reality is just as complex as the one that exists in Montenegro. In this regard, it is enough to recall the large anti-state resistance movements of the opposition prior to the referendum on Montenegro's independence, which nevertheless accepted the new political reality in the aftermath of the referendum. Therefore, it is expected that after the admission of Montenegro to NATO, its opponents will have to understand its irreversibility, once again adjust to the new reality while revising their hard-line political views.

Something similar already happened after the signing of the Brussels Agreement in Serbia, which has become a reality that nobody can deny, despite strong opposition by radical ultranationalist forces in the country. Following the same model, once the conditions are in place, decision-makers in Belgrade will be able to cope with the challenges of Serbia's accession to NATO - which is a historical inevitability, and the only real guarantee of long-term security of the country. Cut off from Russia and taken into historical inevitability, now dominant opposition to the membership will, like in Montenegro, have to adapt to the new reality. Until then, the Serbian society will first have to get used to the new circumstances that the region of the Western Balkans is now completely in the zone of exclusive influence of NATO and away from the dangers that Russia, politically more distant every day, will have the potential to jeopardize the existing system of collective security in the Balkans in the future.